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Introduction

There is an increasing recognition in economics that social interactions play a major role in
explaining a range of individual behaviors, as well as the individual’s valuation of both the
decision and the resulting outcome.1 Peer eﬀects have been indicated as important determinants of behavior in a variety of contexts. Examples include education, crime, labor market,
fertility, obesity, productivity, participation in welfare programs, risky behavior, to mention a
few (for surveys, see Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2001; Moﬃtt, 2001; Durlauf, 2004; Ioannides
and Loury, 2004; Jackson, 2009; Ioannides, 2012). In many social phenomena peer eﬀects stems
from preferences for conformity. Conformism is the idea that the easiest and hence best life
is attained by doing one’s very best to blend in with one’s surroundings, and to do nothing
eccentric or out of the ordinary in any way. In an economy with conformity preferences peer
eﬀects are viewed as a social norm and individuals pay a cost from deviating from this norm.
Diﬀerent aspects of conformism and social norms have been explored from a theoretical point of
view. To name a few, (i) peer pressures and partnerships (Kandel and Lazear 1992) where peer
pressure arises when individuals deviate from a well-established group norm, e.g. individuals
are penalized for working less than the group norm, (ii) religion (Iannaccone 1992, Berman
2000) since praying is much more satisfying the more participants there are, (iii) social status
and social distance (Akerlof 1980, 1997, Bernheim 1994, among others) where deviations from
the social norm (average action) imply a loss of reputation and status, (iv) crime (Glaser et
al. 1996, Patacchini and Zenou 2012) where individual wants to minimize the social distance
between her crime level and that of her reference group.
In this paper we study whether conformist behavior aﬀects the individual demand for housing quality. The literature on social interactions in the housing market is extremely limited (see
Ioannides, 2012 for a critical survey) and presents two important challenges: (i) to disentangle
peer eﬀects from neighborhood eﬀects; (ii) to explain how peers inﬂuence each other, i.e. the
mechanism generating such social interactions.
The study of peer eﬀects in housing decisions is, however, paramount for policy purposes.
1

The integration of models of social interactions within economic theory is an active and interesting area of
research. See the recent Handbook of Social Economics (Benhabib, Bisin and Jackson (eds), 2011)
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One of the reason suggesting government intervention in the housing market is ineﬃciency
in housing consumption. Housing renovations improve not only one’s own property but also
neighbors’ property values. However, this externality is not internalized in the individual’s
calculation of whether or not to undertake an improvement. As a results, the marginal social
beneﬁts of the improvement exceed the private marginal costs, and the property owner is likely
to invest less than a socially eﬃcient amount. Under this perspective, the existence of peer
eﬀects could overcome the underprovision of local public goods (Rosen 1985).
Ioannides and Zabel (2000) are the ﬁrst to consider housing demand with neighborhood
eﬀects. They use the neighborhood cluster level information provided in a special sample of
the American Housing Survey to measure neighborhood inﬂuences.2
Our analysis uses detailed data on friendship networks within residential neighborhoods
to measure peer groups more precisely than previous studies and elaborates on a conformism
model, presented by Patacchini and Zenou (2012), to guide the interpretation of the results.3
More precisely, borrowing from Patacchini and Zenou (2012), we ﬁrst present a social network
model of peer eﬀects that show how conformism aﬀects the demand for housing quality. We
then take the model to the data by using the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent
Health (AddHealth). This data contains unique information on friendship relationships among
a representative sample of students from U.S. high school teenagers together with residential
neighborhood identiﬁers. The survey design also includes a questionnairre administered to the
interviewers which collects information on the type and quality of the respondent’s residential
building and area of residence. These questions are thus informative of each student’s household
decisions about house maintenance, repair and renovation. Under the assumption that the
children’s social contacts in the neighborhood are a good approximation of their parents’ social
contacts, these data are thus able to shed some light on the importance of social interactions
in the demand for housing quality.
Empirical tests of models of social interactions are quite problematic. The issues that
2

Ioannides and Zabel (2008) introduce neighhborhood choice to the analysis of the housing demand with
neighborhood eﬀects.
3
The constraints imposed by the available disaggregated data force many studies to analyze peer eﬀects at a
quite aggregate and arbitrary level, such as at the neighborhood level (see, e.g. the recent literature by Durlauf,
2004, Ioannides and Topa, 2010, and Ioannides, 2011).
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render the identiﬁcation and measurement of peer eﬀects quite diﬃcult are well known: : (i)
reﬂection, which is a particular case of simultaneity (Manski, 1993) and (ii) endogeneity, which
may arise for both peer self-selection and unobserved common (group) correlated eﬀects.
In this paper, we exploit the architecture of social networks to overcome this set of problems
and to achieve the identiﬁcation of endogenous peer eﬀects. More speciﬁcally, in social networks,
each agent has a diﬀerent peer-group, i.e. diﬀerent friends with whom each teenager directly
interacts. This feature of social networks guarantees the presence of excluded friends from
the reference group (peer-group) of each agent, which are, however, included in the reference
group of his/her best (direct) friends. This identiﬁcation strategy is similar in spirit to the
one used in the standard simultaneous equation model, where at least one exogenous variable
needs to be excluded from each equation. In addition, because we observe the precise patterns
of social interactions within neighborhoods (i.e. diﬀerent peer groups over neighborhoods), we
can include neighborhood ﬁxed eﬀects in the empirical speciﬁcation of the model. By doing
so, we are thus able to disentangle peer eﬀects from the presence of neighborhood unobserved
factors aﬀecting both individual and peer behaviors. Such factors might be important omitted
variables driving the sorting of agents into neighborhoods.
This strategy leads to the following main ﬁndings: conformity plays an important role in
the individual demand for housing quality. If we consider an average group of 4 best friends
(linked to each other in a network), a standard deviation increase in the demand for housing
quality of each of the peers translates into a roughly 15 percent of a standard deviation increase
in the individual demand for housing quality. This eﬀect is larger in urban areas and virtually
zero in non urban areas.
The analysis of peer eﬀects is, however, a complex issue and our analysis obviously has
some limitations. Firstly, our model is only one of the possible mechanisms generating such
externalities. It is not, however, rejected by our data and it serves to highlight the importance
of non market interactions in explaining individual demand for housing quality. Secondly, in
the absence of experimental data, one can never be sure to have captured all the behavioral
intricacies that lead individuals to associate with others. In addition, our data provides an
imprecise measure of the demand for housing quality. Nevertheless, by using both within-
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and between-network variation and by taking advantage of the unusually large information on
teenagers’ behavior provided by our dataset, our analysis is a valid attempt to overcome the
empirical diﬃculties.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. In the next section, we present the theoretical
framework that helps us to understand how social contacts can inﬂuence individual demand
for housing quality. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical strategy. In Section 4, we
present our empirical results. Section 5 checks the sensitivity of our results to measurement
errors in peer groups. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

2

Theoretical framework

Following Patacchini and Zenou (2012), we present a social network model of peer eﬀects with
conformity preferences for the demand of housing quality.
There are N = {1, . . . , n} individuals in the economy distributed among K residential
neighborhoods. Let nk be the number of individuals in the kth neighborhood, so that N =
PK

k=1 nk .

Each neighborhood contains several networks.

The network

The adjacency matrix G = [gij ] of a network g keeps track of the direct

connections in this network. Here, two players i and j are directly connected (i.e. best friends)
in g if and only if gij = 1, and gij = 0, otherwise. Given that friendship is a reciprocal
relationship, we set gij = gji .4 We also set gii = 0. The set of individual i’s best friends (direct
connections) is: Ni (g) = {j =
6 i | gij = 1}, which is of size gi (i.e. gi =

Pn

j=1 gij

is the number

of direct links of individual i). This means in particular that, if i and j are best friends, then in
6 Nj (g) unless the graph/network is complete (i.e. each individual is friend with
general Ni (g) =
everybody in the network). This also implies that groups of friends may overlap if individuals
have common best friends. To summarize, the reference group of each individual i is Ni (g),
i.e. the set of his/her best friends, which does not include him/herself.
4

This is not an important assumption since all our theoretical results hold even when gij =
6 gji . We discuss
this issue in Section 5.

5

Preferences

Individuals in network g decide how much eﬀort to exert in home mainte-

nance, repair and renovation. We denote by yi the eﬀort level of individual i in network g and
by Y = (y1 , ..., yn )0 the population eﬀort proﬁle in network g. Denote by y i the average eﬀort
of individual i’s best friends. It is given by:
n
1 X
yi =
gij yj
gi j=1

(1)

Each agent i in neighborhood k selects an eﬀort yi,k ≥ 0, and obtains a payoﬀ ui,k (Y, g) that
depends on the eﬀort proﬁle Y and on the underlying network g, in the following way:
1 2
d
ui,k (Y, g) = (ai,k + η k + εi,k ) yi,k − yi,k
− (yi,k − y i,k )2
2
2

(2)

where d > 0 and y i,k = y i (as the neighborhoods do not overlap). The beneﬁt part of this utility
2 ; both are increasing in own eﬀort
function is given by (ai,k + η k + εi,k ) yi,k while the cost is 12 yi,k

yi,k . In this part, ai,k denotes the agent’s ex-ante idiosyncratic heterogeneity, which is assumed
to be deterministic, perfectly observable by all individuals in the network and corresponds to
the observable characteristics of individual i (e.g. sex, race, age, parental education) and to the
observable average characteristics of individual i’s best friends, i.e. average level of parental
education of i’s friends, etc. (contextual eﬀects). To be more precise, ai,k can be written as:

ai,k =

M
X

m=1

β m xm
i,k

M X
n
1 X
+
θm gij xm
j,k
gi m=1 j=1

(3)

where xm
i is a set of M variables accounting for observable diﬀerences in individual characteristics of individual i, and β m , θm are parameters. In the utility function (2) η k denotes the
unobservable neighborhood characteristics and εi,k is an error term, meaning that there is some
uncertainty in the beneﬁt part of the utility function. Both η k and εi,k are observed by the
individuals but not by the researcher. The second part of the utility function

d
2

(yi,k − y i,k )2

reﬂects the inﬂuence of friends’ behavior on own action. It is such that each individual wants to
minimize the social distance between herself and her reference group, where d is the parameter
describing the taste for conformity. Here, the individual loses utility

6

d
2

(yi,k − y i,k )2 from failing

to conform to others. This is the standard way economists have been modelling conformity
(see, among others, Akerlof, 1980, Bernheim, 1994, Kandel and Lazear, 1992, Akerlof, 1997,
Fershtman and Weiss, 1998; Patacchini and Zenou, 2012). In the context of the demand for
housing quality, a taste for conformity captures the idea of ”keeping up with the Joneses,”
where individuals view their neighbors’ decisions about maintenance, repair and renovation,
and do their best to keep up by making similar decisions.5 The social norm can be interpreted
as friends’ social status, as signalled by house quality.
Observe that the social norm here captures the diﬀerences between individuals due to
network eﬀects. It means that individuals have diﬀerent types of friends and thus diﬀerent
reference groups y i,k . As a result, the social norm each individual i faces is endogenous and
depends on her location in the network as well as the structure of the network.
Nash equilibrium
In this game where agents choose their eﬀort level yi,k ≥ 0 simultaneously, there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium (Patacchini and Zenou 2012) given by:
∗
yi,k
=φ

nk
1 X
gij yj∗ + (1 − φ) (ai,k + η k + εi,k )
gi j=1

(4)

where φ = d/(1 + d). The optimal eﬀort level depends on the individual ex ante heterogeneity
(ai,k ), on the unobserved neighborhood characteristics (η k ) and it is increasing with the average
eﬀort of the reference group. This means that the more well kept the houses of one’s friends
are, the more the individual will provide eﬀort in the upkeep of her own house.

3
3.1

Data and empirical strategy
Data

Our data source is the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (AddHealth), which
contains detailed information on a nationally representative sample of 90,118 students in
5
Morris and Winter (1975, 1978) introduced the notion of “housing deﬁcit” to conceptualize residential
(dis)satisfaction. In their housing adjustment model of residential mobility, they theorize that individuals judge
their housing conditions according to predeﬁned norms, which are dictated by societal living standards or rules.
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roughly 130 private and public schools, entering grades 7-12 in the 1994-1995 school year.6
Every pupil attending the sampled schools on the interview day is asked to complete a questionnaire (in-school survey) containing questions on respondents’ demographic and behavioral
characteristics, education, family background and friendship. A subset of adolescents selected
from the rosters of the sampled schools, about 20,000 individuals, is then asked to complete a
longer questionnaire containing questions relating to more sensitive individual and household
information (in-home survey and parental data). AddHealth contains unique information on
friendship relationships, which is crucial for our analysis. The friendship information is based
upon actual friends nominations. Pupils were asked to identify their best friends from a school
roster (up to ﬁve males and ﬁve females).7 A link exists between two friends if at least one of
the two individuals has identiﬁed the other as his/her best friend.8 Importantly, these data also
contain each respondent’s residential neighborhood identiﬁer. Hence, it is possible to reconstruct the geometry of the friendship networks within each neighborhood. Neighborhoods are
deﬁned as census tracts. By matching the identiﬁcation numbers of the friendship nominations
to respondents’ identiﬁcation numbers, one can also obtain information on the characteristics
of nominated friends.
Besides information on family background, school quality and area of residence, the AddHealth data enclose information on the interviewer’s remarks after having visited the students’
house for the in-home interview. We use this information to construct our dependent variable
yi,k . Speciﬁcally, the interviewer is asked: ”How well kept is the building in which the respondent lives?”, with possible answers ”very poorly kept (needs major repairs)”, ”poorly kept
(needs minor repairs)”, ”fairly well kept (needs cosmetic work” and ”very well kept”, coded 1
to 4.9 The interviewer questionnaire also asks to describe the immediate area or street (one
6

For a detailed description of the survey and data, see the AddHealth website at:
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth.
7
The limit in the number of nominations is not binding, not even by gender. Less than 1 percent of the
students in our sample show a list of ten best friends, less than 3 percent a list of ﬁve males and roughly 4
percent name ﬁve females. On average, they declare to have 5.65 friends with a small dispersion around this
mean value (standard deviation equal to 1.41).
8
Note that, when an individual i identiﬁes a best friend j who does not belong to the surveyed schools, the
database does not include j in the network of i; it provides no information about j. However, in the large
majority of cases (more than 94%), students tend to nominate best friends who are students in the same school
and thus are systematically included in the network (and in the neighborhood patterns of social interactions).
9
The residential building concides with the residential house in the majority of the cases (more than 75% of
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block, both sides) where the respondent lives. We use this question to investigate whether peer
eﬀects in the demand for housing quality diﬀer between urban and non urban areas.10 Using
the corresponding information for nominated friends, we are able, for each individual i in neighborhood k, to calculate the average eﬀort y i,k of his/her peer group. Excluding the individuals
with missing or inadequate information, we obtain a ﬁnal sample of 10,431 students distributed
over 451 networks. Table A1 in the Data Appendix gives the deﬁnition of the variables used in
our study as well as their descriptive statistics. Among the individuals selected in our sample,
46 percent are female and 17 percent are non whites. The average parental education is highschool graduate. Roughly 10 percent have parents working in a managerial occupation, another
10 percent in the oﬃce or sales sector, 25 percent in a professional/technical occupation, and
roughly 20 percent have parents in manual occupations. Roughly 65 percent of our individuals
come from a household with two married parents and from a household of about four people
on average. More than 60 percent of our adolescents have an active social life, as measured by
the participation to clubs, organization or teams.

3.2

Empirical strategy

Guided by the behavioral mechanism formalized in Section 2, our aim is to assess the actual
∗ .
empirical relationship between the neighbors’ eﬀort y ∗i,k and individual eﬀort level yi,k

Let r̄k be the total number of networks in neighborhood k, nrk be the number of individuals
in the rth network gr in neighborhood k, and let nk =

Pr̄k

r=1 nrk

be the total number of sample

observations in neighborhood k. The empirical equivalent of the ﬁrst order conditions of our
network model of peer eﬀects (equation 4) is given by:

yi,r,κ

nrκ
nrκ
M
M X
X
1 X
1 X
m m
=φ
gij,r yj,r,k +
β 1 xi,r,κ +
θm gij,r xm
j,r,κ + η k + εi,r,k
g
gi,r j=1
i,r m=1 j=1
m=1

(5)

where yi,r,κ , is the housing quality of the household of student i in network r and residing in
the students live in semidetached or detached single family houses). The results remain largely unchanged if we
exclude individuals living in apartment buildings.
10
Urban areas mainly indicate residential only areas, whereas non urban areas includes rural, suburban, mostly
retail and mostly industrial areas.
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neighborhood κ, xm
i,r,κ (for m = 1, ..., M ) is the set of M control variables, gi,r =
the number of direct links of i,

Pnrκ

j=1





Pnrκ

j=1 gij,r

is

gij,r xm
j,r,κ /gi,r is the set of the average values of the

M controls of i’s direct friends (i.e. contextual eﬀects). As stated in the theoretical model,
PM

m m
m=1 β 1 xi,r,κ

+

1
gi,r

PM

m=1

Pnrκ

m
j=1 θ m gij,r xj,r,κ

reﬂects the ex ante idiosyncratic heterogeneity

of each individual i, and our measure of taste for conformity or strength of peer eﬀects is
captured by the parameter φ (in the theoretical model φ = d/ (1 + d)). To be more precise,

φ = d/ (1 + d) measures the taste for conformity relative to the direct, time or psychological
costs of home repair and maintenance. Finally, η k captures neighborhood speciﬁc unobserved
factors (constant over individuals in the same network), which might be correlated with the
regressors, and εi,k,r is a white noise error. A precise description of the variables included
and the corresponding descriptive statistics are contained in the Data Appendix to this paper
(Table A.1, Appendix 1).
A number of papers have dealt with the identiﬁcation and estimation of peer eﬀects in
model (5) using network data (e.g. Clark and Loheac 2007; Lee 2007; Bramoullè et al. 2009;
Liu and Lee, 2010, Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009; Lin, 2010; Lee et al., 2010, Patacchini and
Zenou, 2012). The common strategy is to exploit the architecture of network contacts to
disentangle endogenous from exogenous (contextual) eﬀects.11 Model (5) can then be estimated
using an Instrumental Variables or Maximum Likelihood approach. We follow this literature
and estimate our conformism model using Maximul Likelihood (as in Patacchini and Zenou,
2012).12
In model (5), φ represents the endogenous eﬀects, where an agent’s choice/outcome may
depend on those of his/her friends on the same activity; and θ represents the contextual effect, where an agent’s choice/outcome may depend on the exogenous characteristics of his/her
friends. The vector of neighborhood ﬁxed eﬀects η k captures the correlated eﬀect where agents
11
It is well known that endogenous and contextual eﬀects cannot be separately identiﬁed in a linear-in-means
model due to the reﬂection problem, ﬁrst formulated by Manski (1993). In social networks data, the intransitivity
in social connections provides an exclusion restriction to identify endogenous and contextual eﬀects (see, e.g.
Bramoullè et al. 2009).
12
In the spatial econometrics literature, model (5) is the so-called spatial lag model or mixed-regressive spatial
autoregressive model (Anselin, 1988) with the addition of a neighborhood-speciﬁc component of the error term.
Once the variables are transformed in deviations from the neighborhood-speciﬁc means, a Maximum Likelihood
b, γ
approach (see, e.g. Anselin, 1988) allows us to estimate jointly β
b, and b
φ.
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in the same network may behave similarly as they have similar unobserved individual characteristics or they face a similar environment.

4

Empirical results

The maximum likelihood estimation results of model (5) are reported in Table 1 (ﬁrst column).13 The table shows that the estimated coeﬃcient of φ, which measures the taste for
conformity, is statistically signiﬁcant and has a positive sign. In a group of two friends, a
standard deviation increase in the demand for housing quality of the friend translates into
a roughly 3.5 percent increase of a standard deviation in the individual demand for housing
quality. If we consider an average group of 4 best friends (linked to each other in a network),
a standard deviation increase in the level of activity of each of the peers translates into a
roughly 15 percent increase of a standard deviation in the individual level of activity. This is a
non-negligible eﬀect, especially given our long list of controls. This evidence thus supports our
theoretical framework predicting a relevant role of peers and conformity to peers’ behavior in
shaping housing-related decisions.

[Insert T able 1 here]
In order to further our understanding of the results, we estimate model (5) for individulas
living in urban and non urban areas separately. The results are collected in the last two columns
of Table 1. The basic idea of our theoretical model is that agents’ behavior in terms of housing
quality choices is driven by their desire to reduce the discrepancy between their own house
quality and that of their reference group (i.e. their best friends). Social interactions are the
law of motion of this mechanism. If this is the behavioral mechanism at work, then we should
observe in our data that peer eﬀects are stronger in urban areas, i.e. where social interactions
are more intense. Indeed, people living in urban areas have richer social opportunities than
people living in non urban areas, and they may get more beneﬁt from conforming to the
13

When the model is estimated with an increasing set of controls (i.e. by adding the diﬀerent groups listed in
φ decreases, thus indicating we are capturing important confounding factors. However,
Table A.1) the value of b
the qualitative results remain unchanged. The complete list of estimation results are available upon request.
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standards of their social group. It appears that peer eﬀects are stronger for individuals living
in urban areas. They are not even statistically signiﬁcant for individuals living in non urban
areas. Hence, this evidence lends further support to the theoretical mechanism presented in
Section 3.

5

Robustness check: Undirected vs directed networks

Our theoretical model and consequently our empirical investigation assume, so far, that friendship relationships are symmetric, i.e. gij = gji . In this Section, we check how sensitive our
results are to such an assumption, i.e. to a possible measurement error in the deﬁnition of
the peer group. Indeed, our data make it possible to know exactly who nominates whom in a
network and we ﬁnd that 12 percent of relationships in our dataset are not reciprocal. Instead
of constructing undirected network, we will now focus on the analysis of directed networks.
In the language of graph theory, in a directed graph, a link has two distinct ends: a head
(the end with an arrow) and a tail. Each end is counted separately. The sum of head endpoints
count toward the indegree and the sum of tail endpoints count toward the outdegree. Formally,
we denote a link from i to j as gij = 1 if j has nominated i as his/her friend, and gij = 0,
otherwise. The indegree of student i, denoted by gi+ , is the number of nominations student i
receives from other students, that is gi+ =

P

j

gij . The outdegree of student i, denoted by gi− ,

is the number of friends student i nominates, that is gi− =

P

j

gji . We can thus construct two

types of directed networks, one based on indegrees and the other based on outdegrees. Observe
that, by deﬁnition, while in undirected networks the adjacency matrix G = [gij ] is symmetric,
in directed networks it is asymmetric.
From a theoretical point of view, the symmetry of G does not play any explicit role and thus
all the results remain valid with a non-symmetric G (Patacchini and Zenou, 2012). Turning
to the empirical analysis, we report in Tables 2 and 3 the results of the estimation of model
(5) when the directed nature of the network data is taken into account. It appears that our
results are only minimally aﬀected in both tables. The estimated peer eﬀects remain positive
and statistically signiﬁcant.
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[Insert T ables 2 and 3 here]

6

Concluding remarks

Housing is a composite commodity that satisﬁes dwelling needs, but it also provides other
intangibles such as security, access to jobs and social status. The diversity in individual preferences along these diﬀerent dimensions leads to a large heterogeneity in the revealed behavior,
that is, the demand for housing quality. An understanding of the importance of non market
factors in housing related decisions is crucial to design more eﬀective housing programs.
Although our results are not conclusive on the determinants of non functional demand
for housing services, they suggest that social comparisons originated in one’s own residential
neighbohood are important in shaping the demand for housing quality. There is little doubt
that individuals’ satisfaction with a given behavior also depends on what one achieves in relative
terms, i.e. compared to other individuals. A ”conspicuous consumption” (Veblen, 1899) or a
”bandwagon eﬀect” are cases where the commodity serves the purpose of social belonging or
status deﬁnition (Leibenstein, 1950). For most individuals, housing is the largest consumption
and investment item of their life. A discrepancy between current and desired housing needs
may create stress or dissatisfaction through migration or remodelling and thus distraction of
resources from alternative investments such as education. Individuals’ subjective evaluation
of their housing forms the basis of demand for public action. This suggests that an eﬀective
policy should take into account the group interactions it stimulates.
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[7] Bramoullé, Y., Djebbari, H. and B. Fortin (2009), “Indentiﬁcation of peer eﬀects through
social networks,” Journal of Econometrics 150, 41-55.
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Table 1: Maximum likelihood estimation results
Dependent variable: house quality
All sample

Urban areas

Non urban areas

0.0423∗∗

0.0587∗∗∗

0.0360

(0.0205)

(0.0219)

(0.0239)

Individual socio-demographic variables

yes

yes

yes

Family background variables

yes

yes

yes

Contextual eﬀects

yes

yes

yes

Neighborhood ﬁxed eﬀects

yes

yes

yes

0.6910

0.6677

0.6521

Variable
Conformism / peer eﬀects (φ)

pseudo-R2

Notes:

- Estimated coeﬃcients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported
- Estimation using SpaceStat v1.93 (Anselin, 1995).
- Control variables are those listed in Table A.1
- Regressions include weights to control for the AddHealth survey design

-

∗∗ , ∗∗∗

indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 and 1 percent levels
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Table 2: Maximum likelihood estimation results
Dependent variable: house quality
- Directed networks using indegrees All sample

Urban areas

Non urban areas

0.0469∗∗

0.0613∗∗

0.0401

(0.0279)

(0.0284)

(0.0310)

Individual socio-demographic variables

yes

yes

yes

Family background variables

yes

yes

yes

Contextual eﬀects

yes

yes

yes

Neighborhood ﬁxed eﬀects

yes

yes

yes

0.5704

0.5808

0.5676

Variable
Conformism / peer eﬀects (φ)

pseudo-R2

Notes:

- Estimated coeﬃcients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported
- Estimation using SpaceStat v1.93 (Anselin, 1995).
- Control variables are those listed in Table A.1
- Regressions include weights to control for the AddHealth survey design

-

∗∗ , ∗∗∗

indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 and 1 percent levels
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Table 3: Maximum likelihood estimation results
Dependent variable: house quality
- Directed networks using outdegrees -

All sample

Urban areas

Non urban areas

0.0515∗∗

0.0606∗∗

0.0372

(0.0251)

(0.0286)

(0.0304)

Individual socio-demographic variables

yes

yes

yes

Family background variables

yes

yes

yes

Contextual eﬀects

yes

yes

yes

Neighborhood ﬁxed eﬀects

yes

yes

yes

0.6145

0.6467

0.6252

Variable
Conformism / peer eﬀects (φ)

pseudo-R2

Notes:

- Estimated coeﬃcients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported
- Estimation using SpaceStat v1.93 (Anselin, 1995).
- Control variables are those listed in Table A.1
- Regressions include weights to control for the AddHealth survey design

-

∗∗

indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level
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